Binance-affiliated entities filed a Hong Kong petition against RedotPay’s founders, alleging the payment startup used its partnership with Binance to divert more than 470,000 Binance Card customers into its own competing stablecoin card.
As Bloomberg News reported, Binance claims $472.8 million in losses, built on an estimated $925 lifetime value per customer, and says RedotPay received roughly $304 million in user funds routed through Binance Pay.
RedotPay denies the allegations and says the case will not affect its daily operations.
RedotPay says it now serves more than 8 million users and processes roughly $14 billion in annualized payment volume, a scale that reportedly has the company considering an IPO at a valuation above $4 billion.
Binance alleges that scale came partly from customers RedotPay was never supposed to have.The value of a stablecoin product lies in whatever app the customer opens every day to spend, top up, or check a balance.
That app captures conversion fees, card-spending revenue, merchant data, and the chance to sell the customer something else later.
Binance claims that RedotPay used a funding rail meant for one purpose to build a direct relationship with those same customers.
Asset in disputeBinance’s alleged roleRedotPay’s alleged gainWhy it mattersBinance Card customersOriginal customer relationshipMore than 470,000 users allegedly divertedUser ownership became the disputed assetBinance Pay funding railTop-up route into partner productRoughly $304 million in user fundsFunding rails can become acquisition channelsStablecoin card activitySpending use case Binance wanted to retainDirect card relationship with usersDaily spending creates engagement and dataCustomer lifetime valueBinance estimates $925 per customer$472.8 million claimed lossShows how valuable payment users have becomeRedotPay scaleBinance alleges partnership helped growth8 million users, $14 billion annualized volumeStablecoin cards are now large enough to litigate
Every stablecoin partnership carries the same tension
Coinbase shows the same structure playing out without a lawsuit attached. Circle pays Coinbase for USDC distribution and shares reserve economics based on how much USDC sits within Coinbase’s products, according to Circle’s own public filings.
Coinbase remains USDC’s largest distribution partner and also backs Open USD, a rival stablecoin model built with Visa, Mastercard and more than 140 other companies. The model splits reserve income among the businesses driving adoption.
Circle needs Coinbase to reach users, and Coinbase gains negotiating power by making stablecoins compete for space inside its own app.
Visa and Stripe show the same dynamic without any conflicts yet. Visa’s cards give Stripe-owned Bridge the merchant reach it needs to let apps like Phantom and MetaMask spend stablecoin balances, while Bridge gives Visa a route into wallet-native crypto spending.
Both companies continue to expand beyond that arrangement.
Stripe now offers stablecoin wallets, card issuing, and its own token infrastructure through Bridge and Privy.
Visa introduced its own platform for minting, moving, and settling stablecoins in July. Visa says it already backs more than 130 stablecoin-linked card programs across more than 50 countries and expects that number to roughly double this year.
Bridge-enabled Visa cards are already live in 18 countries, with plans to reach more than 100 by year-end.
Mastercard agreed to acquire stablecoin infrastructure firm BVNK for up to $1.8 billion, buying the plumbing that determines how stablecoin payments are issued, converted, and settled.
Mastercard’s own crypto partner program includes Binance, Coinbase-linked wallet providers, Circle, PayPal, MetaMask and dozens of other firms, many of which compete directly with each other.
Owning BVNK gives Mastercard a stake in the infrastructure sitting underneath all of them.
A similar fight is opening between stablecoin issuers and the platforms that distribute their tokens. Open USD is built to solve this on the issuer’s side by splitting nearly all of its reserve income with the businesses that drive adoption.
That model squeezes any issuer whose distributors currently take a smaller cut. The conflict usually shows up in quieter ways: a wallet making one stablecoin the default, an exchange waiving fees for a preferred token, or a card rewarding whichever stablecoin its partner favors.
Phantom and MetaMask can now connect a stablecoin balance directly to a Visa card via infrastructure like Bridge, allowing users to spend without routing funds back through a centralized exchange.
The exchange may still supply stablecoins or liquidity behind the scenes, but the wallet captures the balance, spending data, rewards, and daily engagement that previously belonged to the exchange.
RelationshipWhy they need each otherWhere they now overlapStrategic tensionBinance / RedotPayExchange users and payment-card distributionCompeting stablecoin cardsA funding partner can become the user-facing appCircle / CoinbaseUSDC distribution and reserve sharingCoinbase also backs Open USDDistributor can make stablecoins compete for placementVisa / Bridge-StripeVisa gives merchant reach; Bridge gives wallet-native crypto accessBoth are expanding stablecoin infrastructureCard network and infrastructure provider move up the stackMastercard / BVNKMastercard needed stablecoin infrastructureMastercard is buying the infrastructure layerPartners may sit on rails Mastercard ownsExchanges / wallet cardsExchanges supply liquidity and stablecoinsWallets capture spending and balancesExchange risks becoming a funding pipeIssuers / distributorsIssuers need circulationDistributors control defaults, fees and rewardsReserve income becomes bargaining power
How the fight over the customer plays out
The stakes are concrete for the people using these products. A top-up route that worked yesterday can stop working if a partnership ends, and rewards can tilt toward whichever stablecoin a company wants to promote.
Cards can be migrated to a new issuer with little warning, and support can fragment across a wallet, a card issuer, and an exchange, each blaming the others when something breaks.
The tokens themselves stay transferable on-chain, but the experience of using them depends on private commercial deals between companies that compete with each other as often as they cooperate.
The bull case is that this competition makes the products better for their users. Apps are starting to disclose which partner operates the wallet, card, or settlement layer beneath their brand.
Balances become portable across providers, funding routes multiply, and companies compete on price and reliability to keep customers.
The bear case is that customer capture becomes the business model. Companies keep using partner rails to acquire users, then quietly build their own card, wallet, or stablecoin to keep them.
User-facing featureHidden dependencyWhat can changeCard top-upsExchange, wallet, processor or payment railRoute disappears or new fees appearRewardsPreferred stablecoin or card partnerRewards shift toward one token or providerSpending accessCard issuer and network relationshipCard is migrated, paused or restrictedConversion pricingLiquidity provider or infrastructure partnerSpread widens or conversion becomes unavailableWithdrawalsWallet, issuer and compliance stackFunds remain on-chain but become harder to move through the appCustomer supportMultiple companies behind one productUsers get bounced between wallet, issuer, card provider and exchangeStablecoin defaultApp-level product decisionUsers are nudged into the token that benefits the platform most
Funding routes disappear with little notice, rewards get restructured to box users into a single provider, and disputes like Binance’s against RedotPay become a routine cost of doing business.
Stablecoins made the dollar portable across borders, and now stablecoin cards are making the customer just as portable between companies.
